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Trust and virtue in banking:  the assessment of borrowers by bank 
managements at the turn of the twentieth century1 
 
First secure an independent income, then practice virtue.  (Greek proverb) 
 
Silver and gold are not the only coin:  virtue too passes current all over the 
world.  (Euripides, 5th century BC) 
 
Banks are financial intermediaries who mediate between those in financial surplus and those 
in financial deficit, and between those making and receiving payments.  As such, they must 
manage risk and uncertainty.  In doing so, banks require information, most importantly in 
order to redress the information asymmetries inherent in lending, whereby the borrower 
knows more about their likelihood to default than the lender.  Therefore, crucial in a bank's 
role as financial intermediary is the ability to extract information from borrowing and 
potential borrowing customers, in addition to that from the general economic environment, 
and consequently process the data.  This suggests that banks will develop internal systems by 
which information may be obtained and assessed efficiently.  This system of data gathering 
and processing may be called the 'information structure' of a bank.  What is less clear is how 
information was utilised in making lending decisions. 
 
The paper aims to examine both the perceptions of banks' managements and the procedures 
undertaken by them in the assessment of borrowing customers in England and Wales at the 
turn of the twentieth century.  To what extent were judgements made on 'subjective' criteria 
(reputation, social standing, 'virtue', etc.) or 'objective' criteria (financial statements, profits, 
accumulated wealth of partners, etc.)?  Was a customer's 'reputation' important in banks' 
assessment of their creditworthiness and did the perceptions of 'reputation' change over 
time?  How was 'reputation' defined?  Did the amalgamation movement and consequent 
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concentration in banking lead to a radical overhaul in the 'information structure' of banks?  
Did an increasingly centralised structure impose a uniform policy which branches were 
required to follow?  Did personalised banking, which had efficiently utilised local 
knowledge over the previous centuries, disappear in the headlong rush for size and a London 
head office?  Or were the larger-scale banks, with their greater resources, better able to 
collect and process information effectively?  As the century progressed, the use of formal 
accounting measures increased, but did this replace the use of ‘subjective’ judgements of 
customers? 
 
An attempt has been made to answer these questions by examining the archives of banks 
operating around the turn of the century, from c.1870 to c.1920.  Due to the volume of 
information, sampling has been necessary.  Moreover, the sample is somewhat skewed as the 
records examined are those of banks which survived and were ultimately amalgamated into 
what became the 'Big Five' banks by 1920.  However, there were very few bank failures after 
1878 which offsets this bias.  Moreover, previous experience of consulting bank archives for 
the earlier part of the nineteenth century has also been drawn upon. 
 
The type of archives consulted were ‘Opinion’ and ‘Character’ books.  Banks used ‘Opinion’ 
books to collate information regarding customers which had been gathered from various 
parties - for example, bank directors, bank managers, suppliers of the potential client, or 
another bank on which bills had been drawn.  'Character Books', ledgers designed to provide 
information relating to the status of the client, were also collated.  Moreover, contemporary 
banking literature published in order to provide guidance for banking professionals, such as 
the Bankers Magazine, will also be examined.  Although the research conducted for this 
paper cannot claim to be in any way exhaustive, the author is confident that the archives and 
sources examined offer a reasonable representation of assessment practices carried out by 
banks when applications for credit were made.  Moreover, the findings for this study have 




The paper will focus upon the 'subjective' assessment of potential borrowing customers of 
banks in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  'Objective' assessment criteria will 
also be considered but primarily with reference to their use in conjunction with 'subjective' 
information.  Moreover, analysis will be qualitative rather than quantitative in nature, 
reflecting the character of the sources consulted.  The paper will examine some of the theory 
surrounding 'subjective' information; the background of banking developments during the 
period under consideration; methods and criteria by which bank customers were assessed; 
and finally offers some conclusions. 
 
I 
The traditional principles of banking involved bank managements assessing and spreading 
risk.2  In 1928 Sykes identified the four key principles of banking as ‘safety’, ‘adequacy’, 
‘economy’ and ‘efficiency’.3  In lending money to customers, arising risks could be reduced 
by collecting information in order to assess the creditworthiness of a customer and possibly a 
specific project for which accommodation was required.  The examination of how banks 
utilised information in the process of making lending decisions is fraught with problems.  
The difficulty lies in the collection and interpretation of evidence.  Banks are naturally 
reluctant to reveal such information:  the bank which possessed an efficient mechanism for 
assessing borrowing customers would have an obvious advantage over others in the lending 
market.  Moreover, the interpretation of information is specific to the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries when late twentieth century perceptions did not apply. 
 
Despite these difficulties, an attempt has been made here to examine the criteria which were 
used to assess clients who applied for credit from the bank, particularly the 'subjective' 
information utilised by the banks.  For example, the concept of 'virtue' as applied to a 
borrowing customer has been examined.  'Virtue' may be defined as 'worth; moral 
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excellence; good quality, especially moral'.4  Maitland, in his examination of virtue in the 
economic environment, argues that 'effective functioning of the economy depends on moral 
virtues that economic actors bring to the market place' and that virtue counteracts the 
destructive influence of the market (which promotes self-interest) upon society and the 
economy.5 Hirsch identifies social virtues as:  truth, trust, acceptance, restraint and 
obligation.6  Indeed, trust in business transactions, but especially in lending transactions, 
remains essential in a modern environment.7   
 
Reliance upon external measures to guarantee trust, for example contracts and law courts, 
was expensive, thus transaction costs would increase if such methods were utilised.  
Fukuyama asserts that 'If people who have to work together in an enterprise trust one another 
because they are all operating according to a common set of ethical norms, doing business 
costs less'.8  Therefore, the use of reputations and trust may have reduced costs for the 
banker.  However, an element of moral hazard would remain.  Why should a borrowing 
customer of a bank not transgress if it was in their economic interest?  This is where honesty, 
trustworthiness and self-control may have moderated economic self-interest.  Those in 
business may have sought to maintain their virtuous reputation, and therefore their 
trustworthiness, as it was in their self-interest:  the reputation for being trustworthy was 
likely to have created business opportunities and, in the case of bank lending, may have 
increased the likelihood of gaining access to credit.  Maitland asserts that virtues are a source 
of economic benefit to those who possess them as ‘virtues (or the reputation of having them) 
may create valuable future business opportunities’.9   Conversely, a 'bad' reputation gained 
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by an individual who failed to co-operate in business, repay debts, etc. may be ostracised 
from a business environment and therefore find it very difficult to trade profitably.10   
 
Thus, in business the future was a very important consideration as actors in the economy 
were forced to project forward in order to consider future transactions.11  This is neatly 
summarised by David Hume in his A Treatise of Human Nature (1740).   
 
I learn to do service to another, without bearing him any real kindness:  
because I foresee, that he will return my service, in expectation of another of 
the same kind, and in order to maintain the same correspondence of good 
offices with me or others.  And accordingly, after I have serv'd him and he is 
in possession of the advantage arising from my actions, he is induc'd to 
perform his part, as foreseeing the consequences of his refusal.12 
 
Maitland argues that participants in the economy are forced to consider the impact that their 
behaviour may have upon future transactions and therefore opportunistic behaviour is 
prohibited.  This was, and is, especially true of bank/business relations which may be 
extended over a period of time.  Long-term relationships between banks and customers were 
likely to develop trust between the two parties, if the actors behaved in a trustworthy manner 
and, specifically, if customers repaid their debts.  The length of a bank's relationship with the 
customer was also crucial in information gathering:  the longer a customer was with a bank, 
the more information about them may have been accumulated and a better assessment of 
their creditworthiness made.13  Thus an information advantage was created.  As a 
consequence, existing customers of the bank with a ‘virtuous’ reputation and track record of 
repayment may have been granted credit more freely than new applicants with no history at 
the bank or branch.14  Williamson concurs, asserting that repeated transaction with the same 
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refuse loans?' Business History, Vol. 38, No. 1, 1996. 
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partners may be a source of significant economic advantage.15 Furthermore, Mayer has 
emphasised that long-term, close bank/industry relationships may reduce moral hazard.  
Such relationships, he argues, form a commitment which may replace long-term, written 
contracts as the latter are often not feasible.16 
 
The assessment of customer's 'virtue' and trustworthiness by the banks, and its application to 
lending decisions, may be described as the 'reputation' approach.17  However, banks also 
used 'objective' sources of information, such as company balance sheets, profit and loss 
accounts, the value of property owned by a customer, etc., in order to assess their customer's 
creditworthiness.  What the remainder of this paper will try to discover is whether such 
assessment criteria changed over the turn of the century, as banks became more 
concentrated, and which set of information was the more important - 'objective' or 
'subjective'.  Firstly it is important to consider the changes which occurred in the banking 
sector during the period under consideration.   
 
II 
From their inception in 1826 until the 1870s, joint stock banks in England and Wales 
conducted business on a very localised level and of a personalised nature.  There were some 
regional banks but very few national institutions.  The promotion of extra-regional banks, 
which meant in practice the extension of business into the provinces from London-based 
banks, only really developed after 1860.  In 1874 only two banks had major branch 
networks:  the London & County with 149 offices and agencies, and the National & 
Provincial with 138, while, on average, joint stock banks had still but 10.5 branches. 
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Directors of a typical joint stock bank - relatively small with few branches - were often 
businessmen themselves, involved in local industry and commerce, and were therefore 
involved in local business networks.  These directors were able to utilise their personal 
knowledge and participation in local business networks in order to assess their borrowing 
customers.18   
 
However, during the second half of the nineteenth century, the business and economic 
environment became increasingly sophisticated and operated on such a magnitude that 
small-scale, localised banking could no longer cope with the demands of its commercial and 
industrial customers; they could no longer provide the volume of finance required.  Joint 
stock banks in England and Wales responded to these changes by amalgamating in order to 
achieve physical and financial growth.  Amalgamations accelerated from the 1860s onwards, 
with the peak of merger activity occurring in the late 1880s and early 1890s - between 1880 
and 1894 a total of 69 mergers took place19.  Another surge of merger activity occurred in 
the decade leading up to the First World War.  The result was that the number of joint stock 
banks fell from a peak of 128 in 1880 to only 65 by 1905 and the total number of banks fell 
from 600 in 1825 to 70 by 1913.20  Amalgamations did not stop during the First World War 
and the emergence of the 'Big Five' in 1918 - Barclays, Lloyds, National Provincial, Midland 
and The Westminster - was the culmination of concentration in banking in England and 
Wales which established the structure of domestic banking for the next 50 years.21 
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The development of large-scale, branch banking meant that process of collecting and 
processing information became outdated.  Personalised channels of information were no 
longer as effective and thus the information structure of banks was becoming obsolete.22  
Branches could still operate at a local level but banks in England and Wales were becoming 
increasingly centralised towards the end of the century.  What may have been described as 
'relationship' banking appeared to be in the process of being superseded by what may be 
called 'transaction' banking.23  Indeed, concentration via amalgamations had the benefit of 
economies of scale, as costs for a large combine were reduced upon introducing more 
efficient, centralised management and operating systems.  Banks actively reformed their 
management systems following amalgamation rather than allow separate constituent banks 
to continue operating autonomously.24   
 
Moreover, banking itself was becoming an increasingly professionalised occupation.  The 
Institute of Bankers in Scotland was founded 1875 and the Institute of Bankers was 
established in 1879.25  Such professional bodies reflected a pull in the standardisation of 
banking practice; the need to cope with expanding numbers of customer and staff required 
such developments. 26   
 
Great concern was expressed by contemporaries that such centralisation would affect the 
lending practices of joint stock banks and much consequent research has attempted to 
analyse the impact of concentration in banking upon lending, especially to small-scale and 
industrial customers.27  The new, large-scale, centralised banks, it was argued, took much of 
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the power to make lending decisions away from the local manager and instead lending policy 
was decided at a head office in London where there was limited appreciation of local or 
regional needs.  In this new system, the close personal monitoring of clients by bank 
directors was no longer feasible.  Bank managements also needed national knowledge of a 
more complex economic environment.  This resulted in the adaptation of the bank's 
'information structure'.  Da Rin contends that 'impersonal credit markets have less 
monitoring power due to the distance of financial intermediaries from their customers'.28  
Morison maintains that in the process of developing economic sophistication, relationship 
banking gave way to transaction banking, and that the bond of trust between banker and 
customer was loosened as a result.29  Yet bank managers at branch level would have been 
able to continue local monitoring, even if centralised directors did not.  Did branches of the 
large joint stock banks manage to maintain their personal links with business?  Or did the 
new centralised decision-making process, whereby branch managers reported to the directors 
at a head office in London, result in more conservative lending practices?  This paper will 
now go on to examine the assessment of information pertaining to borrowing customers of 
the banks over the turn of the century when such major changes where taking place. 
 
III 
How did banks assess potential borrowing customers?  Firstly, the reputation approach, 
discussed above, may have been taken in which 'subjective' criteria were used such in 
assessment procedures.30  Secondly, banks could undertake an assessment of tangible assets, 
or rather the examination of 'objective' criteria, for example, balance sheets, existing debt, 
company profits and turnover, levels of personal wealth of partners or directors, etc.  An 
examination of the ‘reputation’ approach taken by banks at the turn of the century will 
initially be made, and this will provide the focus for the remainder of this paper. 
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30 Pohle, 'Risk, information and noise', p. 32. 
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Trust, confidence and personal relations remained an important part in banking, even as it 
increased in size and centralisation.  Indeed, in the modern business world, reputation is 
recognised as a form of 'warranty' and is especially important to knowledge-based 
institutions such as banks.31  In the case of French and German banks in the nineteenth 
century, Pohle has argued that the 'reputation approach' was paramount in assessing 
borrowing customers.  
 
When bankers resorted to older methods of appraisal, information for a transaction 
(such as balance sheet data and technical assessment) was completely replaced by 
information about the personal reputation of business partners and technical experts.32   
Such reputation, Pohle argued, was based upon bourgeois values.  Moreover, even the first 
credit rating agency, established in 1841, 'mainly gathered information of the character traits 
and personal habits of businessmen, rather than operational data of their firms.'33  Indeed, the 
examination of English and Welsh bank archives demonstrates that bankers relied upon 
'reputation' in the early twentieth century.  Bank managements repeatedly comment on their 
borrowing customer's 'undoubted' or 'doubtful' reputation. 
 
When considering 'subjective' methods of credit appraisal, it is important to bear in mind the 
implicit values utilised by bankers in late nineteenth and early twentieth century England and 
Wales when assessing their customer's reputations.  No formal questionnaire has been found 
which details the opinions or judgements on which decisions were made by bank 
managements about their customers.  Appendix A shows a set of criteria which was used by 
the National Provincial Bank in the early twentieth century which includes ‘character and 
connection’ but does not indicate how ‘character' was assessed.  Yet an implicit, if not 
explicit, set of criteria appears to have been utilised when assessing customers ‘subjectively’ 
and these criteria were used through the late-nineteenth and into the twentieth century.  The 
recurring language found in the archival material of the banks describes 'good' or 'virtuous' 
                                                 
31 Furthermore, it has been recognised in recent literature that reputations, in helping a company obtain 
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customers as 'sound', 'safe', 'reliable', 'steady', 'responsible', ‘respectable’.34  Other frequently 
used adjectives include 'industrious' and 'thrifty' - reflections of the traditional Protestant 
work ethic.35  This appears to be the language of 'virtue' as far as the bank is concerned.  
However, whilst viewing data from late twentieth century, historians must be aware that 
perceptions concerning language and judgements from an earlier period will necessarily 
differ.   
 
In assessing such virtuous qualities, the length of the relationship between bank and 
customer was very important.  Banks were likely to develop relationships with their clients 
over a period of time in order to ensure that there was a sufficient flow of information on 
which decisions could be made.  Indeed, it has always has been far easier for a bank to assess 
a long-standing customer than a new client due to the accumulation of information about the 
former which a bank may draw upon, in addition to the establishment of trust between the 
two parties.  The accumulation of knowledge by a bank concerning its existing customers 
occurred through the processes of observation and monitoring.  Extended relationships 
between bank and client also had the benefit of reducing the costs of monitoring.36    
 
References to the length of a client’s time with a bank are to be frequently found in the 
archives.  By 1908, a hosier in the East End had banked with the Whitechapel branch of 
Midland Bank for 25 years, a fact that was commented upon by the manager when offering 
any opinion regarding the client.  During this time the bank had obviously been able to 
monitor his account:  the manager recorded in 1910 that ‘we see transactions on his a/c to 
the extent of your figures in a well spread series’.37  Branches of the National Provincial 
                                                 
34 Such language appears to confirm the conservative character of bankers, especially British bankers. 
35 See M. Weber, The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism (London, 1930).   
36 See Newton 'Domestic Institutional change'. 
37 HSBC Group Archives [hereafter HSBCGA]: Midland Bank [hereafter MB], Whitechapel branch, 
Opinion Book, 546, 9th Mar. 1908 and 23rd Apr. 1910, f.28. 
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bank also refer to 'a reliable old client', 'an old and valued customer', 'old respectable and 
substantial customers', 'one of our oldest and best clients'.38   
 
There is also evidence that a long relationship with the bank could prove to be beneficial to 
the customer with regard to obtaining credit.  Banks appeared to be quite flexible with the 
credit facilities of established borrowers and this conforms with the theoretical literature 
discussed in section I.  A firm of corn merchants who banked at the Brighton branch of the 
National Provincial were described as 'old and valued' customers but also ones who 
'occasionally exceed the sanctioned limit without notice'.  However the manager asserted that 
they were 'considered good.'  Another customer at the same branch was again referred to as 
'old and respectable' and, despite the firm occasionally exceeding 'sanction when purchasing 
cargoes of wheat (without notice)', were 'considered quite responsible.'39  When discussing a 
farmer banking with a Wiltshire branch of the National Provincial, the Manager described a 
man 'seriously pinched by a large debt'.  However, the farmer was an old and trusted 
customer of the bank and one who, the Manager believed, 'with better times likely to do 
well'.40  This conforms with the findings of other historians.  In her study of business and 
banking in Yorkshire between 1750 and 1850, Hudson states that ‘if a manufacturer gained 
respectable status he could be assured of continuing support from institutions of the capital 
market and from lenders or suppliers even in hard times.'41 
 
Monitoring customers could aid the banker in avoiding future provision of credit to 
customers who were unlikely to repay or for projects that were not viable.  Monitoring could 
also be used to punish ‘bad’ behaviour.  In 1924 a client of Midland Bank was described 
                                                 
38 NatWest Group Archives [hereafter NWGA]:  National Provincial Bank [hereafter NPB], Tunstall 
Branch, character book, 9966, f.29, 16th Jan. 1903; Brighton Branch, Information Book, 20521, Apr. 
1907, f. 39 and f. 10; Berkeley Branch, Character Book 21218, 3 May 1883, f.59.   
39 NWGA:  NPB, Brighton Branch, Information Book, 20521, June 1906, f. 18 and July 1906 f. 10.   
40 NWGA:  NPB, Tunstall Branch, character book, 9966, 4th Jan. 1881, f. 3. 
 In additional to being long-standing customers, it is important to note that the above mentioned were 
also 'doing substantial business', had collateral security deposited at the bank, or owned property and 
stock of substantial value.   
41  P. Hudson, The genesis of industrial capital.  A study of the West Riding wool textile industry c. 1750-
1850 (1986), p. 269. 
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thus:  ‘He has conducted his a/c here so unsatisfactorily that we have had to write and warn 
him that we would have to close his a/c unless he improves’.42  However, the assertion made 
by a modern economist that ‘monitoring the firm’s characteristics, i.e. a creditworthiness 
test, makes it possible to avoid bad loans'43 clearly had no basis in reality for the late 
nineteenth/early twentieth century banker.  Perfect information - certainty made possible 
through acquiring primary information - was not an attainable goal and therefore banks 
could make incorrect business decisions.  External circumstances could, obviously, also 
intervene to damage a previously healthy business.  Indeed, despite their best efforts and 
experience and despite screening and monitoring borrowing clients, banks could, and did, 
make unsuccessful decisions.  In 1909 a shoe manufacturing firm in East London, who had 
been with the bank since 1868 and was described as ‘very respectable’, ‘trustworthy’, ‘good 
for’ rent of 65 pounds per annum and running a successful business, went bankrupt.44  A 
recent text on modern corporate finance states:  ‘Like all financial decisions, credit 
allocation involves a strong dose of judgement’.45  These judgements could be misguided. 
 
The need for monitoring and the use of the 'reputation' approach was accentuated under 
certain circumstances, for example when banks provided credit upon which no collateral 
security was deposited.  This was a frequent practice in nineteenth and early twentieth 
century banking.  Capie and Collins estimate from their research on banking between 1870 
and 1914 that 'over half of the industrial overdrafts made in the provinces did not involve the 
formal deposit of securities: they were made either wholly unsecured or relied on the signing 
of personal guarantees'.46  In an examination of banks in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, Newton found that 30 per cent of credit extended by provincial banks in a sample 
were unsecured or extended on the basis of personal guarantees.47  Wale, in her study of the 
Leicestershire Banking Company in the late nineteenth century, revealed that 28 per cent of 
                                                 
42 HSBCGA:  MB, Whitechapel branch, Opinion Book, 546, 11th Mar. 1924. 
43  T. Broecker, ‘Credit-worthiness tests and interbank competition’, Econometrica, 58 (1990), pp. 
429-52. 
44 HSBCGA:  MB, Whitechapel branch, Opinion Book, 546, 20th Apr. 107 to 1909, f.124. 
45 R.A. Brealey, and S.C. Myers, Principles of corporate finance (1996), p. 860. 
46 Capie and Collins, 'Industrial lending’, p. 35. 
47 See Newton, 'Domestic Institutional change'. 
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overdrafts extended between 1896 and 1898 were secured by a customers 'personal 
responsibility', or rather no formal collateral security.48  Alternatively, the customer may 
have been unwilling to provide financial (objective) information about their business and 
thus past experience and  'reputation' became crucial.  In 1903 a customer of the Tunstall 
Branch of the National Provincial Bank is described as a 'highly respectable and reliable old 
client' with 'an old established and regular business' but also one who had a 'very touchy 
temperament and will not give estimate of his means.'49 
 
Did bankers in England and Wales at the turn of the century place such emphasis on 
customer's reputation and 'virtue' that it obscured other assessment criteria, as Pohle's 
example demonstrates?  The author argues that it did not.  In appraising their customers, 
bank records create the impression that reputation is paramount.  The language which 
dominates these records is that of customer 'soundness', 'safety' and 'reliability' - traits of 
virtue.  Yet other criteria were also being utilised by the banks in order to assess 
creditworthiness:  'virtue' was not the sole criteria on which a potential borrowing customer 
was judged.   
 
Indeed, the discussion of reputation may sometimes be misleading.  With such interpretation 
the historian must obviously be wary about interpreting language and judgements from an 
earlier period which will necessarily be infused with different meanings.  Moreover, the 
language and perceptions found in the bank archives would appear to differ from those of 
contemporaries in a non-business or non-banking environment.  An excellent illustration of 
this has been found by examining the 'Opinion Book' of the Whitechapel branch of Midland 
Bank.  The records of one particular customer from 1908 onwards describe the business 
partners as 'trustworthy' and 'respectable'.  This firm of rag merchants had been banking at 
the branch since 1898.  They met 'their engagements promptly' and in applying for credit of 
                                                 
48 Judith Wale, 'What help have the banks given British industry?  Some evidence on bank lending in the 
Midlands in the late nineteenth century', Accounting, Business and Financial History, Vol. 4, No. 2, 
1994, pp. 329-331. 
49 NWGA:  NPB, Tunstall Branch, character book, 9966, f.29, 16th Jan. 1903.   
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between £50 and £500 repayment was described as being 'well within their usual 
engagements'.50  However, the commentary also included the information that the two 
partners (brothers in the same firm) had recently undertaken six months hard labour for 
handling stolen property.  This information is recorded twice in the 'Opinion Book' and is 
followed by further descriptions of the brothers’ 'respectability' 'means' and 'standing'.  It 
appears that the business was indeed very sound and profitable and that the bank enjoyed a 
relatively long-term and prosperous relationship with these customers.51  Thus, the business 
clients could be assessed as 'undoubted' and 'trusted' in that they were proven to be reliable 
re-payers of any credit extended.  The same language could not be applied to them outside of 
this very narrow assessment criteria, or rather in the wider world where they had been 
convicted for criminal activity.  Six months hard labour would, presumably, be viewed in 
early twentieth century British society with some stigma.  However, such a sentence appears 
to have elicited a rather understated response from the bank.  This example illustrates that 
the ultimate assessment of this customer by the bank concerned their ability to repay credit:  
this was the 'reputation' that mattered to a bank.  Such virtue may be described as one of 
business rather than morality.   
 
This again conforms with the findings of Hudson in her examination of early nineteenth 
century business and banking in West Yorkshire. 
 
Being respectable had little to do with social morality but everything to do with 
property and a reputation for regularity in paying debts and avoiding speculation.  
The ‘respectable’ were the propertied, ...... the well known in the neighbourhood, 
the native, the naturalised or the long-resident and those who avoided 
accommodation or bills or similar improper commercial dealings.52   
Hudson concludes that the one enduring feature of nineteenth century business and access to 
credit ‘appears to have been the importance of maintaining trusted, respected and propertied 
status in the eyes of the local business community.’ 53 
 
                                                 
50 HSBCGA:  MB, Whitechapel branch, Opinion Book, 546. 
51 The brothers moved their account in 1914 after 16 years with the branch. 
52  Hudson, Genesis of industrial capital, p. 269. 
53  ibid., p. 270. 
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Indeed, when examining the records more closely, the word ‘safe’ is frequently qualified by 
‘for that amount’; ‘responsible’ is combined with ‘for the figures’; and ‘trustworthy’ is given 
the proviso ‘for the quotation’.54  A customer of the National Provincial in Brighton was 
described in 1906 as 'respectable, trustworthy' but also 'possessed of some means'.55  Thus 
these value judgements are being made with regard to business criteria:  the ability or 
responsibility of the client to repay the credit applied for.   
 
A comment concerning a customer of the Whitechapel branch of Midland Bank illustrates 
that the manager considered the applicant ‘trustworthy for business engagements’ or 
‘trustworthy in the way of business’. A woman running a boot and shoe manufacturing 
company was described as ‘respectable judging from the turnover on the company’s a/c’.56  
In Wiltshire, National Provincial customers are described as 'respectable' and 'trustworthy' 
but these adjectives are combined with 'industrious', 'understands his business' or a 'keen 
man of business'.57  These comments explicitly defined the parameters of a customer’s 
‘virtue’:  judgement was being made in the business rather than moral sense of the word.58  
Conversely, at the Worcester branch of the National Provincial Bank a Character Book 
describes a customer who owned and ran a stationery business as 'very respectable steady 
and reliable but not a very good man of business'.59   
 
Furthermore, information considered by the banks which may at first glance appear to be 
indicators of moral or social virtue would also have been motivated by a practical business 
sense, or objective assessment.  Rich relatives could enhance reputation and status but also 
provide 'objective' criteria for assessment.  A draper in Southsea is described as having 'a 
well to do Uncle who would assist him in case of need'.60  The bank was clearly including a 
third party in its credit assessment who could act as guarantor or financial saviour in times of 
                                                 
54 HSBCGA:  MB, Whitechapel branch, Opinion Book, 546, 7th Feb. 1905 and 27th Mar. 1906, f.25. 
55 NWGA:  NPB, Brighton Branch, Information Book, 20521, June 1906, f. 18. 
56 ibid., comments from 1910-1911, f.57. 
57 NWGA:  NPB, Berkeley Branch, Character Book 21218, f. 3, 1879, 1881. 
58 ibid., 27th Jan. 1908, f.26. 
59 NWGA:  NPB, Worcester Branch, Character Book 20688, f. 12, 1903. 
60 NWGA:  NPB, Southsea Branch, Character book, 21254, f.109, 12th Mar. 1907. 
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need.  In this case the bank is explicit in naming alternative sources of familial finance but 
elsewhere banks merely refer to relatives with property or businesses.   
 
The Southsea branch of the National Provincial Bank also recorded the philanthropic 
activities of a customer:  'Gives a good deal to charities.  Highly respected and trustworthy.'61  
However, although such charitable activity may be viewed as morally 'virtuous' it also 
provided an indication that the customer had enough money to distribute to worthy causes 
and therefore was likely to have the means to repay credit.  The 'Book of Instructions' (1914) 
of the National Provincial Bank provides guidance to its staff which may also be considered 
indicators of behaviour that the bank saw as 'virtuous' or, conversely, 'sinful':  'Habits such as 
intemperance, betting or gambling of any description,......or speculation in any securities, are 
expressly forbidden.'62  Again, such moral guidance reflected sound business principals on 
the part of the bank.  It was quite possible that similar guidelines may have been extended to 
their customers behaviour, in which case those who drank to much, gambled or speculated 
were likely to be high risk borrowers in the eyes of any bank.  The bank would be more 
interested in the impact that such activities had upon a customer's business performance 
rather than upon their spiritual well-being. 
 
Through an examination of the bank records it became clear that despite a discussion of a 
potential borrowing customer’s reputation for 'soundness' and trustworthiness, a clear and 
'objective' assessment of their ability to repay was also being considered. Thus, reputation 
remained important, but a customer's ability to repay was ultimately just as important, if not 
the most important criteria.   
 
Indeed, the 'reputation' approach was combined with more practical, pragmatic and 
'objective' judgements, further to those considered above.  Objective assessment of potential 
customer's creditworthiness by banks may be viewed as a system of 'credit-rating'.  Modern 
                                                 
61 ibid., f.85, 20th Feb. 1903. 
62 NWGA:  NPB, Book of Instructions, 1914, 6492, f. 5. 
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techniques of assessing a customer’s likelihood of repaying credit may involve a mechanical 
scoring system utilised by a credit rating agency in order to pre-screen applications.  These 
credit-scoring systems are based on assessments of income, property owned and overall 
financial position.63  In the past, this role could be undertaken by the branch manager, 
although in a less formalised manner.64   
 
In the process of 'credit-rating', banks frequently examined business customer's financial 
records.  A potential customer's financial position could be assessed by examining balance 
sheets and accounts, by considering the volume of turnover of a business, or the level of debt 
a customer had already amounted.  Personal wealth was also assessed.  Finally, the call for 
collateral security remained a safe and reliable method by which a bank could reduce the risk 
inherent in lending. 
 
The scrutiny of accounts and balance sheets of those who applied for credit was common 
banking practice and remained so into the twentieth century.  Indeed, by the end of the 
nineteenth century professional accountants were increasingly being used by banks in order to 
assess the financial information of potential and existing borrowing customers.65  Balance 
sheets would show a company's stock levels, level of debt, assets, liabilities and debt/equity 
ratio, all of which could be useful to the banker involved in the assessment of 
creditworthiness.66   However, in the archives consulted for this study it is often unclear how 
banks utilised such financial information in the final decision to extend credit facilities or 
withhold them.  The Instruction Book of the National Provincial Bank from 1914 does not 
provide a great deal more clarity:  'Balance sheets (audited for preference).....should be 
scrutinised carefully and attention drawn to any variations of movement or unusual features.'  
                                                 
63 Brealey and Myers, Principles of corporate finance , pp. 852-854. 
64  Moreover, credit rating systems are not purely modern phenomenon.  Specialist agencies were also 
available to nineteenth century bankers.  ‘The exchange of opinion on credit-worthiness was a long 
established feature of contact between banks but by the late 1870s specialist agencies were also in 
demand.’  Holmes and Green, Midland, p. 64. 
65 Judith Wale, 'A neglected aspect of the growth of the accountancy profession:  the role of English 
deposit banks in providing new work for accountants, 1880-1914', unpublished paper.   
66 Moreover, balance sheets were an indication that company accounts were actually being kept and thus 
may be viewed as having promoted the perception of financial efficiency or confidence.   
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It also (unsurprisingly) cautioned:  'be suspicious with regard to abnormal turnovers and large 
withdrawals of cash'.67  The bank appeared to be looking for figures which fluctuated wildly 
or indicated any difficulties in the business of a customer as indicators of risk.  It would be 
possible to speculate that a healthy balance sheet could be an indicator of a healthy company 
but the unreliability of such financial data during this period, especially when used for public 
consumption, could limit its value.   
 
Highlighting the usefulness of financial data, Wale argues that the regular collection of such 
information by a bank could provide 'an early warning that a customer might have difficulty 
in wiping out or reducing the firm's overdraft'.68  Furthermore, it was in the interests of 
business customer to provide credible financial information in order 'to persuade the bank to 
renew an overdraft facility' and certainly the provision misleading accounts or balance sheets 
would be detrimental to the establishment of a fruitful and long-tern relationship with a 
bank.69  Furthermore, the amalgamation movement at the end of the nineteenth century led to 
greater formalisation in the use of customer financial information by the banks and this will 
be considered in further detail below.   
 
The assets or wealth of a client or the ability to deposit collateral security were further 
'objective' means of avoiding risk for a bank.  For example, when examining branches which 
were located in rural districts, banks often listed in detail the amount of land and stock 
owned by a customer and, most importantly, its value.70  Collateral security, although not 
always required by the banks, was also frequently used as a method for reducing risk on 
accommodation.  This usually took the form of property and land, guarantees, mortgages, or 
promissory notes and tended to be of the same value of the accommodation extended but 
often more, especially on large amounts.71  The provision of collateral security represented a 
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formalisation of the debt contracted by the borrower.  The manager of the Ashton Branch of 
the Manchester and Liverpool District Bank recorded in the Opinion Book that he 'would not 
recommend you to trust him without security.  I think he has but small means’.72  In 1907 the 
Brighton branch of the National Provincial Bank warned that one customer should 'have no 
overdraft unless properly secured'.73  There are numerous other references to collateral 
security which the bank required to be deposited with them in order to for a customer to 
obtain credit.74 
 
Customers were frequently interviewed by bank managers and visits were undertaken to 
business premises by bank staff in order to assess the assets, turnover, the quality of security, 
etc. of a firm.  If a business customer held a private account at the same bank, both types of 
account would be scrutinised.  All were further methods by which banks screened and 
monitored their customers through the sue of 'objective' information.   
 
Thus the banks examined in this study clearly utilised both subjective and objective 
assessment criteria when assessing applications for credit.  Indeed, it may be argued that 
much of what initially appears to be 'subjective' information was also 'objective' in terms of 
its relevance to the customers ability to repay credit.  However, the exact use of such 
information, and the weight attributed to different types of data, is unclear.  Yet the process 
of gathering different types of information on which to base decisions is apparent. 
 
Next, it is necessary to consider changes in the information structures of English and Welsh 
banks over the turn of the century, as the banking sector concentrated and centralised, and 
the impact this had upon decision-making processes. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Institutional change'; and Duncan Ross, 'Information, Collateral and British Bank Lending in the 1930s' 
in Cassis, Feldman and Olsson, The Evolution of Financial Institutions and Markets. 
72 NWGA: Manchester and Liverpool District Bank, Ashton Under Lyne Branch, Opinion Book, 03932, 
25 Jan. 1875, f. 146. 
73 NWGA:  NPB, Brighton Branch, Information Book, 20521, Apr. 1907, f. 39. 
74 NWGA:  NPB, Book of Instructions, 6492, 1914, ff. 97 and 103. 
21 
IV 
Larger, centralised banks had to cope with far-flung branches:  the centre (the bank’s head 
office) needed to extract information from where it was generated (from the peripheral 
branches) and interpret it in a consistent manner.  Did this necessitate increasingly 
formalised screening and monitoring processes by the banks around the turn of the century?  
How did the core control the periphery, especially with regard to information flows and 
lending decisions?  Did centralisation lead to more restrictive lending practices?  Did head 
office deal with larger clients and branches deal with smaller customers?75    
 
Holmes and Green, in their examination of Midland Bank, assert that 'The drive towards 
centralised control coloured Midland's business methods' and 'From the late 1890s Midland's 
branch managers worked to standardised regulations and procedures'.76  This can be seen in 
Appendix B which reproduces a letter to branches instructing branch managers on the form 
and format in which they should provide opinions to outside agencies, when asked, about 
branch customers.  Furthermore, Appendix A shows the standardisation of customer 
assessment by the National Provincial Bank in the early twentieth century.  A list of broad 
criteria were provided by which managers were to assess clients applying for 
accommodation.   
 
However, it was not just centralisation that resulted in changes of bank’s lending practice.  It 
has been argued that the City of Glasgow Bank crash in 1878, followed by an associated 
slump in confidence and business, caused the banks to review and tighten their lending 
policies and practices.77  Holmes and Green describe the process by which Midland Bank 
‘introduced more formality and professionalism into Midland’s banking business’ and its 
lending practices in particular after the 1878 crisis.78  A ‘Bills Committee’ was established 
by Midland directors to enable them to take increased responsibility for auditing bills; 
                                                 
75 The following section draws upon Newton 'Concentration and internationalisation in banking'. 
76 Holmes and Green, Midland., p. 112. 
77  M. Collins, ‘The banking crisis of 1878, Economic History Review, 2nd series, XLII (1989). 
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directors examined quarterly lists of overdrawn accounts; interviews of customers and visits 
to branches by directors were increased; and outside advisors were appointed.  The result, 
conclude Holmes and Green, was ‘a more explicit control over lending.’79   
 
The role of branches remained crucial in the information structure of the banks as they 
expanded geographically and weathered financial storms.  Branches permitted the retention 
and extension of local knowledge and, in authorising the opening of accounts by customers, 
they increased deposits.  Branches thus remained important nodes of information gathering.  
Indeed, as amalgamations were undertaken, rather than banks closing branches in order to 
facilitate economies of scale, they retained and even increased such outlets for their 
activities.80  In 1919, Steele, a banker from the London & County Bank, maintained that the 
new branches opened by amalgamated banks resulted in 'bringing credit facilities within 
easier reach of the small customer in general and the small trader in particular'.81 
 
More branches may have brought credit facilities within reach of more customers, but not all 
developments that arose from increased concentration and control from the centre provided 
positive developments for customers.  An article from the Manchester Guardian in 1904 
commented upon the detrimental effects of large banks operating a centralised system.  The 
disadvantages that arose from a loss of local control to a head office in London were 
discussed.   
 
The moment a chief director loses a firm grasp of every part of the organisation an 
element of weakness and danger is admitted.  In this respect a local combination may 
be superior to one which has its centre of control in London.82 
This opinion was reiterated in 1914 when the new, large-scale banks were considered in the 
Bankers Magazine.  The need for strong central control of the 'great' banks was noted but the 
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view was expressed that it was necessary for banks not to 'over-centralise' and that if 'the 
human factor is allowed full and proper play, all will be well'.83 
 
Writing in 1921 with regard to the recent concentration in banking, Lavington was less than 
complimentary about tighter controls and increasing standardisation of lending practices.  He 
believed that the character of bank accommodation had changed:  'advances are made for 
shorter periods and against better security'.84  Furthermore, he asserted that: 
 
The influential and responsible local banker is replaced by the more mechanically 
trained branch manager, less well informed on local matters and closely controlled by 
his general manager, whose sanction must normally be obtained before the grant of 
an advance of any considerable size.  In these circumstances it is inevitable that local 
knowledge of persons should play a smaller part than formerly in the banks' loan 
policy and that this policy, being determined rather more by the nature of security 
offered than by the character and ability of the borrower, should tend to exclude from 
these borrowers business men who may be unable to offer security for a supply of 
capital but whose character and abilities give them good social title to its use.85  
Thus, Lavington urged that the 'subjective' assessment of borrowers should not be forgotten 
in the rush for greater formalisation and the use of more 'objective' criteria by the large 
corporate banks.   
 
Holden (Chairman of Midland Bank) argued strenuously against claims that businesses, in 
particular small-scale firms, were adversely affected by centralisation when giving evidence 
to the Colwyn Committee in 1918.86  He maintained that, in the case of Midland, the system 
that arose out of amalgamations and concentration actually favoured small businesses and 
private customers.87  Indeed, from the turn of the century Midland Bank required board 
approval for advances over £2,000 whereas those below did not and this approach allowed 
some discretion to branch managers.88  However, other banks operated more restrictive 
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lending practises at branch level.  Branch managers of The London Joint Stock Bank could 
only sanction advances of a few hundred pounds before referral to head office for approval; 
the City Bank limit was between £500 and £1000 per customer, depending upon the branch; 
and the London, County and Westminster country manager could only approve 
accommodation for up to £250 before 1909 and up to £500 after that date.89   
 
Centralisation and standardisation did not necessarily mean increasing detachment from 
customers.  Holmes and Green argue that, following the 1878 bank crisis, by following a 
‘more systematic approach to lending and the evaluation of securities, Midland’s directors 
and managers became closely involved in the financial development of their major 
customers.' 90  By the 1880s securities were investigated thoroughly, whereas previously 
acceptance of securities had been more informal.  In 1900, an article in the Bankers 
Magazine contended that 'purely provincial banks pay less rigid attention to the proper 
completion of securities than the big London banks with ramifications in the provinces'.91  
However, the same article asserted that although a new, London head office may 'rectify' 
such flexible practices regarding security, 'it does not start calling in advances right and left' 
but rather makes arrangements 'that borrowers feel the change of management as little as 
may be'.92   
 
Closer involvement in company finance was also necessary in order to avoid or reduce bad 
debts that had been incurred during the 1878 crisis.  Banks' use of financial information 
pertaining to business customers had long been common practice but towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, following the 1878 crisis and the amalgamation movement, more 
rigorous collection and scrutiny of business customers accounts were undertaken.  Wale 
argues that after 1880 the collection and assessment of customer financial information by all 
of the major banks became increasingly formalised in an attempt to achieve consistency in 
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lending decisions.  If a customer was unable to provide a coherent set of company accounts, 
a branch manager could request that a professionally compiled balance sheet be provided.  
The bank could go further and request permission for a professional accountant to visit a 
firm and inspect it's books.  The increase in demand from banks for precise and reliable 
financial information concerning their customers led to increasing work for the professional 
accountant but many branch managers were also capable of relatively sophisticated 
interpretation of financial information.93   
 
Thus tighter monitoring and controls were introduced after c.1878.  The result of such 
developments upon lending decisions could be viewed as beneficial for the bank and 
customer - it reduced the risk on lending and built a closer relationship between the bank and 
customer.  However, it could also be seen to be detrimental to borrowing customers as 
tighter controls could reduce access to credit.  This could particularly effect small businesses 
who had fewer resources at their disposal and were therefore viewed as a greater risk than 
their larger-scale counterparts.   
 
A statistical analysis by Wale of overdrafts extended by Leicestershire Banking Company 
both prior to and following its amalgamation with Midland Bank in 1900 shows 'a 
significant number of customers still borrowing and apparently enjoying good relations with 
their new bankers'.  Figures reveal that there were decreases in the number of overdrafts 
granted to some industrial sectors in Leicestershire but, Wale argues, 'these were more than 
compensated for by substantial increases in many others'.  Moreover, Midland 'was willing 
to trust just as many customers as its predecessor to take personal responsibility for 
advances, thereby forgoing tangible security'.94  Continuity of management was also 
provided in the case of the Leicestershire Banking Company when it's directors continued to 
serve as an advisory committee to Midland and the former chairman was elected to serve on 
the board of the Midland in London.95  Overall, Wale concludes that Midland head office 
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'was not necessarily remote from branches or insensitive to what was happening to its branch 
customers' and that 'former Leicestershire Banking Co. customers benefited from becoming 
customers of a larger bank which had a better flow of deposits from which to finance their 
needs'.96  Thus, amalgamation did not necessarily lead to separation from local 
constituencies or lending practices which were detrimental to local businesses.   
 
In addition to broad changes in the economy and banking sector, it is also important to 
remember that changes at a micro level could alter lending policy.  At branch level, if a 
Manager was replaced, lending policy could alter dramatically.  An example of this can be 
found at the Tunstall Branch of the National Provincial Bank.  In 1901 the branch Manager 
considered one customer to be 'very industrious and steady' whereas in 1905 a new Manager 
considered the same customer to have had 'a most very unjustified advance of the late 
Managers' and to have been a 'source of trouble years ago'.  The new manager called in the 
previous advance of £100.97 
 
Throughout much of the amalgamation movement contemporary bankers presented 
arguments for and against centralisation in their sector of the economy and it's impact upon 
lending practice and decision-making.  However, what was common to all was emphasis on 
the professional banker practising sound business.  'It has to be remembered that, however 
great the bank may be, fundamentally it is the "Banker" who counts'.98  Therefore, although 
banks were gaining in size and geographical scope, the judgement of the banker remained 
essential. 
 
In more recent historical debates, there was has been a general acknowledgement that the 
smaller provincial banks which predominated before 1880 had been more flexible in their 
industrial lending, as opposed to the London and provincial branch banks of the early 
twentieth century which operated a more formal and bureaucratic style of assessing 
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customer.99  For the majority of the nineteenth century, when banks operated at a local level, 
the bank's managements, through their participation in local business networks, could 
personally glean information concerning a customers 'virtue' or reputation.100  However, at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, when banks were operating at a national level in 
Britain and were dealing with a greatly increased volume of business, methods of gathering 
information about customers became more formalised.  Yet, in the 'Opinion' and 'Character' 
books the language of the nineteenth century banker remained:  customers were still 
described as 'sound', 'safe' and 'responsible' or, conversely, 'unsound' or 'unreliable'.  
Therefore, the language of assessment with regard to customers applying for credit appears 
to have endured throughout the nineteenth and into the early twentieth century.  Judgements, 
and the language utilised by bankers to make such judgements, appear to have remained 
remarkably consistent, despite the huge contemporary changes which occurred in the 
banking sector at the turn of the century.   
 
V 
As banks developed towards the modern corporate form they attempted to impose a 
formalised structure to lending decisions that could be standardised and applied throughout 
their organisations.  Centralisation removed control of lending decisions away from the 
periphery and to the centre, as London head offices replaced local or region decision-
making.  Decisions were no longer exclusively made by branch managers or by local 
directors, but instead the manager tended to report to his superiors in London.  A 
geographical distance was thus inserted in the process by which credit applications were 
appraised and consequently lending decisions were likely to alter.  Indeed, an increase in 
formalisation may be viewed as a result of an increasingly corporate economy in general.  
However, in the period under examination, the bank archives show very little change in 
terms of the types of information and the language used in the assessment of potential 
customer's creditworthiness.  It is interesting to note that whilst procedures may have 
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changed, the language and judgements of the banker appeared to remain consistent even if, 
within the realms of this study, it is difficult to ascertain just what impact changes in the 
banking sector had upon lending outcomes.   
 
Moreover, despite the use of information related to the clients ‘virtue’ and social principles, 
it has also been argued here that the judgements regarding these attributes were more likely 
to be based on property, wealth and a proven track-record for repaying credit rather than a 
notion of ethics or morality.  Or rather, 'virtue' was a proxy for the probity of the client. This 
was applicable to both the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  Thus, although 
reputation and trust played an important role, the gathering of information concerning a 





National Provincial Bank, Bradford Branch character book.  Instruction for compiling the 
character book, 1912-1923. 
'Means etc. of customers' 
Should embody the fullest information obtainable as to:  
 Stock 
 Book debt 
 Investments 
 Landed and other property - whether encumbered or settled and to what 
extent 
 Debts or liabilities of any kind 
Where balance sheets etc. are obtained, these should be record in tabular form in column 
ruled to admit of ready comparison of various items over a period of several years. 
'Misc. information' 
Should be include any data that may be of use in interviewing the account including: 
 Surety obligations 
 Client's business habits 
 Character and connections (if of value) 
 Arrangements made for the conduct of the account, etc.101 
 
                                                 
101 NWGA:  NPB, Bradford Kirkgate branch, Character Book, 1912-1923, 09431. 
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Appendix B 
Letter to branches of Midland Bank concerning the correct procedure of providing 
'opinions' of customers to external organisations 
H.O. 
29th April 1910 
Opinions 
Dear Sir, 
 In giving opinions, we shall be glad if you will discontinue your present method and 
adapt that which is in general use throughout the system with the exception of the North & 
South Wales Bank Branches. 
 Opinions must not be given in any other manner, excepting verbally, where such is 
the custom, than that provided by the Bank's printed memorandum Form No. 570.  The 
Name of the Branch, the date, the name and address of the correspondent and the initials (not 
the name) of the person enquired about are to be inserted.  The opinion is to be written at the 
end of the Form, but no signature or initial (on behalf of the Bank) is to be appended.  The 
form is to be sent out entirely unsigned and uninitialed, so that the identity of the Bank is 
shown only by the addressed heading of the Form./  In giving an opinion, the reply must 
commence with 'Are considered to be etc.' and not 'We believe them to be, etc.,'. 
 In cases where the Debentures of a Company enquired about are held by the Bank, if 
time will permit, the enquiry should be submitted to Head Office before replying, other wise 
a verbal reply should be given wherever practicable, but on sending a written answer Form 
No. 570 must be used as mentioned above.  If the concern is very weak it will generally be 
advisable to say 'that they are short of capital and have debentures issues', but an endeavour 
should be made to avoid giving any information whatever if at all possible.  In future, a 
record of all opinions given in respect of customers of the Branch must be made in the 
'Opinions Given' Book, a suitable place being allotted to each customer in order that any 
subsequent reports may be entered under the heading of the respective customers.  The entry 
in this book should be installed by the Manager or other officer giving the opinion.  
 We enclose a specimen of Form. No. 570 and have asked the Stationery Dept. to 
forward you a supply together with the 'Opinions given' Book. 
 We shall be glad to hear when the same have reached you and the foregoing is 
understood. Sam. B. Murray 
  Joint General Manager 
 
